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Book Review: Reforming the Governance of the Financial
Sector
Many financial institutions have in recent years failed: failed either completely, and gone into
bankruptcy; or failed in the sense that they have not achieved what their owners or their
customers expected them to deliver. This collection of papers aims to consider how the
governance of the financial sector by the authorities can be improved, and how the
governance of firms and institutions within the sector can be improved to minimise the
probability and cost of future crises. Roger McCormick believes the book contains some
excellent material and, despite the over-ambitious title, is a worthwhile contribution to one of
the most vexing issues of our times. 
Reforming the Governance of the Financial Sector. Edited by David
G. Mayes and Geoffrey Wood. Routledge. September 2012.
Find this book:  
To attribute bank f ailures, or indeed the global f inancial crisis as a whole,
to a “f ailure of  corporate governance” has become something of  a
truism. However, without consensus on what we mean by corporate
governance (and the problem is even greater, if  like the tit le of  this book,
we ref er only to “governance”) we might as well just say that the
problems occurred because of  “bad decisions” or “bad behaviour”. The
addition of  hyperbole (HBOS, we are told by a Parliamentary Commission,
f ailed due to “catastrophic f ailures of  management, governance and
regulatory oversight”) does not illuminate the picture greatly.
Having “identif ied the problem” (hindsight being a wonderf ul thing) we
have a tendency to try and make ourselves f eel better about it all by
changing organisational structures (amongst regulators and regulatees)
in the vain hope that this will make the “mistakes” and misbehaviour of
the past less likely in the f uture. If  we could just crack that governance problem, surely
everything would be all right? The widespread f rustration with the apparent pointlessness
of  continually re-arranging structures is evident in our unf ortunate tendency to indulge in the
now-customary vindictive calls f or vengeance, stripping of  t it les, banning f rom positions of
responsibility, f ines, cutting “pension pots” and relentless vilif ication-by-tabloid and TV. Makes us all f eel
so much better! Is this due, at least in part, to a persistent tendency on the part of  those in authority and
learned commentators to avoid blaming real, live people f or f ailure (as opposed to systems and
organisations)?
The tit le of  David G. Mayes’ and Geof f rey Wood’s edited collection of  thirteen papers (f rom a conf erence
held in New Zealand in 2010) might tempt you to think that the “solutions” to the problems attributed to
bank governance could be f ound therein. However, the def init ional problem posed by the “g-word” pervades
the book. In the editors’ Introduction, f or example, “governance” is given a very broad meaning as the
authors look at “governance of  the f inancial sector rather than corporate governance within it” (although
they assert that “problems in corporate governance…..do indeed lie at the heart of  the f inancial crisis”). As
a result, this part of  the book claims that the most obvious “institutional f ailures in governance” were
concerned with a “lack of  responsibility f or f inancial stability at the economy-wide level”, an “inability to
resolve problems without the use of  taxpayer f unds” and “neglect of  the non-bank f inancial sector”. The
blame is apportioned widely (and somewhat vaguely) by claims such as “…although it may have been
corporate governance which  was at f ault, it  was the def iciencies in the regulatory f ramework that let this
happen.” There is  also concern expressed about “governance at the global level.”
It is not until Chapter 3 of  the book (by Christopher Brown and Deborah Ralston) that we get to a def init ion
of  CG. This is based on “the f ramework of  rules, relationships, systems and processes within and by which
authority is exercised and controlled in corporations.” However, this chapter is f ocused on problems in the
governance (and perf ormance) of  superannuation f unds in Australia and the agency problems associated
with trustee governance structures. Since Chapter 2 (by Bruce Sheppard) is concerned with problems in the
f inance company sector in New Zealand, and Chapter 4 (by Wilson, Rose and Pinf old) is concerned with the
f ailure of  Bridgecorp Finance Ltd (in New Zealand), the book gets of f  to a rather “localised” start, which
may limit its appeal to readers in, say, London or New York (notwithstanding that both these chapters make
some interesting points with a potential wider application). Chapter 4 gives us another CG def init ion;
quoting La Porta, it is: “..to a large extent, a set of  mechanisms through which outside investors protect
themselves against expropriation by insiders.” This seem particularly apposite in the case of  banks, given
that “outside investors”, in ef f ect, means just about all of  us. We have a right to be interested in what goes
on inside those shiny corporate bank HQs. Changes to structure, pious statements of  good intention and
a plethora of  codes of  conduct and ethics are not enough. As the authors of  Ch. 4 put it, “If  market
participants are not ethical, no code of  conduct can ever work and alternative prescriptive actions become
necessary.”
Chapter 5 (Kevin Davis) is expressly devoted to “bank governance” and begins by making the point that not
much attention was paid to the topic bef ore 2005. This is a thoughtf ul and thought-provoking contribution
and makes some very interesting points about remuneration structures f or bank executives and their
linkage to shareholder returns vis-a-vis linkage to all stakeholders. There is also a usef ul review of  post-
crisis policies and proposals (although it pre-dates the LIBOR scandal and the heightened concern over
ethics triggered by it).
Another very interesting chapter, by Jef f rey Chwieroth, is concerned with “creating policy stigmas in
f inancial governance”. The author argues that capital controls have a “stigma” attached to them which has
(wrongly, in the author ’s view) made them of f - limits f or policy responses to the crisis (this being written,
obviously, bef ore Cyprus blew up). One of  the sources of  the stigma is alleged to be the IMF, which has
f allen into bad ways of  thinking due to most of  its recruits being….economists! “Fads and f ashions in the
economics prof ession can…. have an important inf luence on the content of  policy stigmas put f orth by the
f und,” we are told. There is certainly f ood f or thought here. One of  the early reactions to the crisis was
that we should think about returning to simpler, “narrower” banking f or the retail market and “separating the
casinos f rom the utilit ies”. This was almost universally met by scornf ul responses f rom the great and the
good that things had moved irretrievably on f rom the days of  high street banks having “managers” that
everyone knew and that there could be “no going back to Captain Mainwaring”. Then along came the Vickers
Commission and the Parliamentary Banking Standards Commission….. and suddenly ring-f encing (and
electrif ied ring f ences at that) are all in vogue. It is hard, also, to see the eurozone crisis without thinking of
the idees fixes that are associated with policy stigmas. Every policy option is open to consideration, it
seems, except the one that seems obvious to those outside the eurozone: recognition that the whole thing
was a misconceived idea and should be dismantled.
The book contains some excellent material and, despite the over-ambitious tit le, is a worthwhile
contribution to one of  the most vexing issues of  our t imes: how to ensure that the semi-public institutions
that we know as banks are run responsibly in a manner that properly balances the interests of  their owners
with those of  their managers and, most important of  all, with those of  the public. There is evidence now
that  banks have (at last) “learned their lesson” f rom the crisis and understand that much needs to be done
by them to restore their reputation and public trust. However, we also know that banks and bankers have
very short memories. The new approach to governance issues needs to include a “lest we f orget” element.
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